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Preliminary remarks
• Assumption underlying this talk is that a platform 
exists providing TPM and TSS functions (as in 
TCG specifications).
• This may not be such a problematic assumption 
for a mobile device.
• ‘Locked down’ devices may be closer to the 
norm, e.g. for mobile phones, where a high 
degree of reliability is expected/required.
• As a result we can investigate interactions 
between specified functionality (of a trusted
platform) and needs of range of use cases.
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Trusted computing research at RHUL
• RHUL research on trusted computing (TC) grew 
out of ongoing research interest in mobile 
security.
• Recent research on TC applications includes:
– Internet single sign-on support;
– Trusted application download for mobile devices;
– Peer-to-peer security (establishment of stable 
identities);
– Distributed PKI support;
– Personal Information management.
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Ongoing research
• Some of this work documented in the recent 
book:
C. Mitchell (ed.), Trusted Computing, IEE Press (UK), 2005.
• Current work includes participation in two funded 
projects:
– Open Trusted Computing (6th Framework IP involving 
over 20 partners; 2005-09);
– Trust Establishment in Mobile Distributed Computing 
Platforms (UK EPSRC funded project, examining 
support for grid security on TC-enabled mobile 
devices; 2006-09).
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OpenTC – trusted mobile devices
• Main role of RHUL in OpenTC is to investigate 
TC applications on mobile platforms.
• Will develop series of mobile use cases, analyse 
them to deduce security requirements, and will 
consider how best to meet requirements using 
TC.
• Help define minimal set of TC functionality for 
mobile environment, and also analyse ‘how 
secure’ mobile TC needs to be.
• Results will be fed into the TCG MPWG. 
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Trust Establishment in Mobile Distributed 
Computing Platforms
• Main goal is to provide mechanisms and 
protocols to establish trust in a mobile grid 
computing environment.
• Will investigate how TC technology can be 
used to provide assurance in integrity of 
remote platforms.
• Consider general distributed trust issues 
and possible solutions.
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TCG MPWG
• The Mobile Phone Working Group 
(MPWG) has published a list of use cases 
for TC in a mobile environment.
• We briefly categorise these (categorisation 
is not mutually exclusive).
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The ‘obvious’ use cases
• The following trusted functionality has 
already been implemented in mobile 
devices using proprietary trusted 
functionality:
– IMEI protection;
– SIMLock;
– Robust implementation of OMA DRM v2.0.
• These are necessary but not ‘killer’ 
applications for TC technology.
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Platform security use cases
• TC can be used to help provide 
guarantees regarding state of mobile 
platform (analogous to use for PCs):
– Trusted boot (platform integrity);
– Device authentication (e.g. TC support for 
SSL);
– Secure storage (a TC-supported function of 
use in many applications).
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Distributed application security
• A number of TC applications can be 
categorised as supporting distributed 
applications – these include:
– Secure software download;
– Robust DRM implementation;
– Mobile payment.
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User security
• Finally, a number of TC applications 
provide functionality to the end user:
– Secure storage and secure processing of 
data;
– Proving OS/application integrity to end user;
– Authentication of remote devices;
– User data protection (user privacy).
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Key applications
• Of the range of applications of TC in a 
mobile environment, the following seem 
particularly appropriate to the public 
sector:
– Platform security (trusted boot, device 
authentication, secure storage, …);
– Secure distributed applications.
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Distributed application management
• Range of ways in which TC can help with 
distributed computing:
– secure download, installation and use of a 
sensitive application (the main focus of this 
talk);
– secure inter-device authentication;
– secure attestation regarding components of a 
distributed computing environment (e.g. for 
Grid), enabling trust regarding handling of 
sensitive data.
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Existing work
• Whilst we have not considered the general 
problem of secure application download, we 
have looked at one particular instance of the 
problem.
• The context is the secure download of 
applications for accessing broadcast content.
• Work described is by Eimear Gallery and Allan 
Tomlinson.
• Seems likely that similar analyses will apply in 
the general case.
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Protection of Broadcast Content
• Broadcast content is currently protected by 
Conditional Access (CA) systems that:
– Scramble the video signal;
– Manage keys and viewing rights using 
proprietary security mechanisms.
• DVB standards provide an interface to 
proprietary CA systems.
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DVB Standards
• Common Scrambling Algorithm (ETSI ETR 289):
– Used to scramble and descramble video;
– Details available to all manufacturers.
• Simulcrypt (ETSI TS 103 197):
– Multiple CA systems in parallel at transmitter;
– Common key to scramble services;
– Key encryption remains proprietary.
• Common Interface (CENELEC 50221)
– Common Interface Modules – PC Cards;
– Changes proprietary CA at receiver.
11
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Problems in a mobile setting
• DVB Standards:
– Provide a flexible interface to proprietary 
systems;
– There are many proprietary systems.
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DVB CA systems
CA System Vendor
Viaccess Viaccess SA
NagraVision Kudelski
Videoguard NDS
Mediguard Canal+
Mcrypt Irdeto
PiSys Irdeto
CryptoWorks Philips
BetaCrypt BetaResearch
Conax Telenor
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Limitations of current protection mechanisms
• New business model:
– Delivery of broadcast services to mobile receivers, with services 
available from many broadcasters.
• Current protection mechanisms:
– Designed for relatively static receivers and services available 
from a small number of broadcasters.
• Common Interface:
– Consumers require multiple PC-Card modules – cost, 
inconvenience, unsuitable for mobile devices.
• Simulcrypt:
– Broadcasters install and maintain multiple CA systems – cost, 
maintenance issues.
• Current mechanisms not designed for mobile receivers.
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Potential Solution
• Download proprietary applications to mobile 
devices on demand
• Problem:
– Applications, and providers, are security sensitive
– Lack of trust in the mobile host:
• Piracy: protection of proprietary algorithms, keys
– Host needs to demonstrate that it can be trusted:
• Application needs protection – not the host
• Trusted Computing provides the mechanisms to 
demonstrate trust.
14
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Requirements
• Demonstration of trustworthiness:
– Integrity challenge mechanism;
– Integrity verification mechanism.
• Application protection:
– Secure delivery mechanism;
– Secure execution environment.
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Application of TCG technology
• Demonstration of trustworthiness:
– Integrity metrics:
• Authenticated boot – CRTM
• Configuration measurements – PCR
• Attestation of current platform configuration – TPM
• Application protection:
– Secure delivery mechanism:
• Key generation and exchange.
– Secure execution environment:
• Sealed storage.
• Isolated domains.
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Trusted download
• Demonstration of trustworthiness:
– Authenticated boot;
– Attestation of platform configuration (response to integrity 
challenge);
– It is the challenger’s responsibility to verify the response and
determine whether to trust the platform or not;
– Host must not change configuration.
• Application protection:
– Key generation;
– Keys in sealed storage to ensure consistent configuration;
– Message Authentication Codes and Encryption;
– Isolation of applications.
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Required security services
1. Confidentiality of application in transit.
2. Integrity of application in transit.
3. Entity authentication:
 Host;
 Application provider.
4. Origin authentication of application.
5. Freshness of messages.
6. Confidentiality and integrity of application while stored on the
device (AC mechanisms to protected the application on the 
device).
7. Confidentiality and integrity of application while executing on the 
device.
16
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Corresponding security mechanisms
1. Symmetric encryption.
2. MACing of the application.
3. Entity authentication protocol runs as described in ISO/IEC 9798-3 
(Host and application provider)
 Attestation (Host) as described within TCG TPM specification 
set.
4. Digital signature of the application provider on the secret keys used 
in providing 1. and 2.
5. Nonces / timestamps.
6. Protected/secure storage, as described in TCG TPM v1.2 
specification set.
7. Memory isolation techniques, e.g. as described by Microsoft with
respect to NGSCB.
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Protocol 1
ETPM     (public)(K1 || K2) || SS (ETPM      (public)(K1 || K2)) || EK1(MACK2(App))
Mobile
Application
AD
TPM Server
TPMCreateWrapKey RS
Sealed
Storage
TPMKey TPMKey
TPMCertifyKey
Request App
RS || IdS || TPMKey || TPM_Certify_Info || STPM ( H (TPMKey(public)) || H (RS || IdS) || I )
KeyKey
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Protocol 2
Mobile
ApplicationTPM Server
Sealed
Storage
K1 || K2
bS || SS (bS || bM || IdM )
EK1(MACK2(App))
STPM (H (bM || bS || IdS) || I)
Request App || bM
TPMSeal(K1 ||  K2)
TPMQuote(H( bM || bS || IdS) || I)
Choose
private DH
key and
generate
shared keys
Generate
shared keys
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Download protocol: Analysis
• RHUL-MA-2005-11 available at: 
www.rhul.ac.uk/mathematics/techreports
• Informal analysis
– Completed against the seven security services required of the 
protocol.
• Formal analysis
– Completed by Rob Delicata, University of Surrey.
• The scope of the informal analysis is wider than that of 
the formal analysis. The informal analysis also presents 
reasons for the protocol's correctness – as opposed to 
the pleasing, but rather underwhelming, Boolean 
response from a formal analysis.
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Comparison of protocols
• The second protocol:
– More applicable to resource limited devices 
since less reliant on asymmetric encryption.
19
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Summary
• Using TC technology:
– Host is able to demonstrate it is running a 
secure execution environment;
– Application provider has confidence that 
software and data will not be tampered;
– User has access to a wider range of 
applications.
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Use cases
• The success of our work in OpenTC 
depends on identifying the most important 
use cases.
• We are already consulting mobile network 
operators.
• We would welcome input on what 
governments believe to be the most 
important mobile use cases.
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Contacts
• For more information on any aspects of this talk, 
please contact me at:
Chris Mitchell
Information Security Group
Royal Holloway
University of London
Egham
Surrey TW20 0EX
UK
c.mitchell@rhul.ac.uk
http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~cjm
+44 1784 443423    (fax: +44 1784 430766)
